The Face of Iraqi Terrorism
The Face of Iraqi Terrorism
A new study shows where the foreign fighters in Iraq are coming from.
Care to guess?
by Stephen Schwartz
03/04/2005 12:00:00 AM
FOR MONTHS, a behind-the-scenes, seldom-mentioned debate has raged in
the West, over the origins of the "foreign fighters" attacking the
U.S., coalition, and local anti-jihadist forces in Iraq. Some,
including Saudi dissidents like Ali al-Ahmed of the Saudi Institute and
myself, have suspected Iraq's dangerous southern neighbor, the kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, of being the main source.
Our evidence often seemed thin. We cited the repeated calls by hundreds
of Saudi clerics for volunteers to go north of the unpatrolled border
to kill themselves and others. We circulated translations and
photographs of Saudi "martyrs" whose biographies appeared in the
kingdom's print media and on websites.
But official opacity was maintained in the West. In mainstream media
and government statements, the jihadist killers were never identified,
beyond noting that they were foreign.
Now we have real evidence, and the verdict still points south of the
Iraqi border.
The Global Research in International Affairs Center in Israel, a highly
reputable and reliable think-tank, has published a paper titled "Arab
volunteers killed in Iraq: an Analysis," available at e-prism.org.
Authored by Dr. Reuven Paz, the paper analyzes the origins of 154 Arab
jihadists killed in Iraq in the last six months, whose names have been
posted on Islamist websites.
The sample does not account for all jihadists in Iraq, but provides a
useful and eye-opening profile of them. Saudi Arabia accounted for 94
jihadists, or 61 percent of the sample, followed by Syria with 16 (10
percent), Iraq itself with only 13 (8 percent), and Kuwait with 11 (7
percent.) The rest included small numbers from Jordan, Lebanon, Libya,
Algeria, Morocco (of which one was a resident in Spain), Yemen,
Tunisia, the Palestinian territories (only 1), Dubai, and Sudan. The
Sudanese was living in Saudi Arabia before he went to die in Iraq.
The names of most of the dead appeared on the websites after the battle
of Falluja, and they were all supporters of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and al
Qaeda.
Of the 94 Saudis, 61 originated in the region of Najd, known as the
heartland of the Wahhabis. The total of 154 included 33 suicide
terrorists, of whom 23 were Saudis (with 10 from Najd). Given that
Najdis make up 43.5 percent of Saudi suicide bombers in Iraq, and 65
percent of all Saudi jihadists on the list, Paz concludes that the
"Wahhabi doctrines of Najd--the heart of Wahhabism--remain highly
effective."
Paz emphasizes that "the support for violent Jihad in Iraq against the
Americans was encouraged by the Saudi Islamic establishment." But he
also offers some interesting observations:
* "Jihadi volunteers constitute a significant portion of the Sunni
insurgents," suggesting that referring to the terrorists as if they
represented Sunnis in general, or were merely guerrillas opposed to a
foreign invader, is inaccurate.
* "Another element to note is the relatively small number of Iraqis
involved in the fighting on behalf of the Zarqawi group."
* "Particularly striking . . . is the absence of Egyptians among
foreign Arab volunteers [in] Iraq, even though Egypt is the largest
Arab country, with millions of sympathizers of Islamist groups." Paz
notes that Egyptians were previously prominent as fighters in
Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Chechnya. He ascribes the failure
of Egyptians to enlist in the Iraqi jihad to a combination of the
decline of Islamist influence in Egypt, effective Egyptian government
action against jihadism, and orders from the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt not to participate physically in the Iraqi jihad.
The predominance of Saudis in Iraqi terrorism also goes a long way
toward explaining the other fact that Western media and government have
been reluctant to admit: the role of Wahhabism as an inciter of
violence against Shias. Wahhabis hate Shias even more than Christians
and Jews, because, as Saudi schools (including those like the Islamic
Saudi Academy in the United States) teach, Christians and Jews have
their own religions that are openly opposed to Islam, but Shias want to
"change Islam," which the Wahhabis consider the personal property of
the Saudi rulers. Few in the West seemed to notice earlier this week
when 2,000 people assembled in Hilla, near Baghdad, to protest a car
bombing that killed at least 125. The demonstrators chanted "No to
terrorism! No to Baathism and Wahhabism!"
Paz concludes his study with words difficult to surpass for their
clarity and relevance: "The intensive involvement of Saudi volunteers
for Jihad in Iraq is . . . the result of the Saudi government's
doublespeak, whereby it is willing to fight terrorism, but only if
directly affected by it on its own soil. Saudi Arabia is either
deliberately ignoring, or incapable and too weak, to engage in open and
brave opposition to Jihadi terrorism outside of the Kingdom . . . Their
blind eyes in the face of the Saudi Islamic establishment's support of
the Jihad in Iraq may pose a greater threat in the future, as the
hundreds of volunteers return home."
Only one thing needs to be added: it's time to close Saudi Arabia's
northern border, silence the jihadist preachers, and cut off the
financing of international Wahhabism.
Stephen Schwartz is the author of The Two Faces of Islam.
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